















In the latter decades of the twentieth century state audit institutions introduced extended forms of audit known as performance audit which were focused on economy, efficiency and effectiveness, in response to the emergence of managerialist models of public sector governance, now referred to as the new public management (NPM) (Kettl, 2000; Lapsley, 1999; Johnston, 2000; Power 2000, pp. 112-6 and 1994, 1996, 1997; Gendron, Cooper and Townley 2000). As public sector performance auditors attempted to negotiate a new, emerging identity they became part of a contest which, according to Skaerbaek (2009), required performance auditors to ‘manoeuvre’ between the identities of moderniser and independent auditor. In the process, the credibility of auditors and the work that they performed came under much greater scrutiny (Londsdale 2008; Pollitt and Summa 1997; Kells 2011; Barrett 2011b; Funnell and Wade 2012). Skaerbaek (2009, p. 972) has described the auditors becoming part of a contest in which the network of partners of the performance auditors, primarily the auditee, attempt to negotiate and possibly delimit a new, emerging, identity of the auditor as they attempt to make the efficiency of the public sector auditable(Skaerbaek 2009, p. 973). 

The complex relationship between auditor and auditee noted in Morin (2001 and 2003) reveals evidence of a dichotomy in the manner in which performance auditors perceive their role, with some seeing themselves as “controllers” and their role exclusively to inform the Parliament, while others see themselves as “catalysts for change” to encourage improvement in public administration.  This is evident in Sharma’s (2007) ethnographic study of performance auditing, also known as value for money auditing, at the British National Audit Office (NAO). According to Sharma (2007, p. 289), the reporting phase of a performance audit is characterised by a complex interplay among auditors, auditees and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) members.  Using a theatrical metaphor, Sharma examines the “performances” of these “actors”:  firstly, the NAO’s “dualistic” roles in balancing its responsibilities to the PAC and its assistance to auditees; secondly, the “damage limitation” exercises carried out by auditees in front of the PAC; and, third, the dramatisations staged by members of the PAC itself as they seek to demonstrate “public accountability in progress” (Sharma, 2007, p. 290).  Sharma’s ethnographic study involved observing and noting the conduct and reporting of audits.  

One of Sharma’s (2007, pp. 296-8) findings that is of particular interest to the present study deals with the NAO’s challenge in balancing its roles as “watchdog” and “consultant”.  This is consistent with the role conflict noted by Radcliffe (1999), the dichotomy of roles discussed in Morin (2003), and the potential for role conflict for the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) created by its dual focus on accountability and adding value. Barrett (2011b, p.397), a former Australian Auditor-General, warns that the absence of program outcome indicators in performance audit reports makes assessment of the usefulness of performance audits “very difficult” (Barrett 2011a, p.99). In terms of the audit continuum, the ANAO’s performance auditing is often seen to occupy the middle ground between financial audits and effectiveness audits, or policy audits, the latter which have never been part of the ANAO’s mandate. The absence of clear-cut boundaries between the different audit levels, as shown below in Figure 1, has meant that the ANAO has often been accused of overstepping its mandate and involving itself in policy effectiveness issues as opposed to administrative effectiveness, which has affected perceptions of the credibility of performance auditing. The form of independence provided for public sector auditors has required that they are excluded from commenting upon matters of policy when conducting performance audits (see Gendron et al 2000, p. 279; Barrett 2011b). They are expected not to question the priorities and objectives of government, only the manner in which these may be achieved. The former are the responsibility of other constitutional bodies, most importantly committees of the legislature such as public accounts committees​[1]​.

Insert Figure 1 here

Crucial to the success of performance auditing is the belief that it produces credible products, that is audits, which instil confidence in the process and the findings. The credibility, and hence acceptance, of performance auditing depends upon perceptions and the experiences during the process of audit of those who carry out the audit, those who are audited and those to whom the auditor reports (Kells 2011). The significant contribution of the present paper is the identification of those requirements of auditors and performance audits which auditees and others believe must be present if performance audits are to be regarded as credible. Schwarzkopf (2007, p.18) notes that “the perceived credibility of the source of information often plays a critical role in decision-making …” by those who receive the information. After a turbulent four decades a number of studies have confirmed that the credibility of performance auditing still remains highly contentious (Funnell and Wade 2012; Skaerbaek 2009; Morin 2003; Radcliffe 1999, 2008). To identify what auditees and those to whom the auditor reports believe constitutes a credible performance audit function, the concerns of the present paper are focused on what Power (2003, p. 380; see also Humphrey, 2008, p. 171) describes as the complex “back stage” of practice.  For this purpose, the study draws on original empirical data gathered by interview and observation in the field. The study recognises the considerable interest in public sector performance auditing and the calls for more studies of public sector auditing in action by following performance auditors throughout the process of audit. This provides the means to deepen our understanding of the responses or ‘manoeuvring’ of auditors and auditees to the process of audit and to each other (Skaerbaek 2009, p. 983; Justesen and Skaerbaek 2010; Morin 2003, p. 19). 

This study of performance audit credibility complements and extends the performance auditing literature by examining the credibility of performance audit at the level of practice. It provides the results of a field study which examined auditor-auditee relationships when access was granted to all the phases and the participants of a performance audit conducted by the ANAO in a major government department, hereafter referred to as the Agency. Notwithstanding the institutional credibility and respect that ANAO performance audit now enjoys, this study demonstrates that the credibility of ANAO performance audit at the level of practice remains problematic. The paper does not argue that ANAO performance audit is without credibility at the level of practice but it does identify problems of auditor independence, technical competence and perceived audit usefulness that jeopardise its claims to credibility. 

The notion of audit credibility adopted for this study is informed by Birnbaum and Stegner’s (1979) theory of source credibility. The study recognises that their theory was meant to apply generally to the provision of information by a recognised source to users of this information, which could include auditors and auditees. In the case of performance auditing the source will be the performance auditor. According to Beaulieu (2001, p.85) source credibility will determine “whether sources of information inspire belief in their representations”. Birnbaum and Stegner’s work is used in this study to structure the interpretation of reactions of both auditees and auditors to the process of performance auditing rather than providing a rigid tool of analysis. Birnbaum and Stegner (1979, p.48) argue that the credibility or believability of information depends upon the perceived willingness and ability of the sender, or the source of the information, to provide reliable, that is believable, information. For audit, this refers to auditors providing, or ‘sending’, audit reports which are the outcome of a process which is captured by the fundamental audit values of auditor independence, objectivity and fairness (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979, p. 49). In addition, Birnbaum and Stegner specify that the credibility of information is also dependent upon the technical competence of the source of the information, in the case of audit the auditor, and their ability to provide useful information. The audit credibility criteria used in this study and the main stakeholders in performance auditing are shown in Figure 2.

Insert Figure 2 Here

In addition to concerns about the motives of the senders of information, according to Birnbaum and Stegner (1979, p. 49) the credibility or believability of information will be influenced by the biases of the receiver who will judge the information. Whereas the notions of source bias and competence are about the message sender, judge bias is about the message recipient. It is intended to convey the idea that a recipient’s personal prejudices and circumstances will influence his/her perceptions of the sender and his/her message which in the case of an audit, where most often there is an expectation that a fault or weakness will be publicly exposed, will be invariably negative as will be the recipient’s interpretation of its meaning and his/her willingness to rely upon it. This aspect of credibility in relation to performance auditing has been examined elsewhere in a recent paper by Funnell and Wade (2012) which uses Oliver’s five-part typology of strategic responses mainly to examine auditee reactions to the behaviour and attitudes of the auditors. The study confirmed the prevalence of auditee responses to performance auditors which ranged from co-operative acquiescence and co-operation to confrontational defiance, a well-established response. While the present study recognises the presence and potential impact of judge bias, the focus is on the sender of the messages, the performance auditor.

Unlike studies of the early adoption and development of performance auditing by Guthrie and Parker (1999), Funnell (1998), Gendron et al (2000) and Radcliffe (1998, 1999), the concern of this paper is performance auditing in its mature state and the standing that it now has after, usually, a very contentious and prolonged period of evolution. This provides the opportunity to determine whether the well-known problems experienced with performance auditing when introduced were peculiar to this innovative phase or whether the nature of performance auditing and of those who are responsible for its practice and the institutional framework in which it operates create problems which are ongoing and endemic to performance audit. In a manner similar to the recent work by Skaerbaek (2009), this study permits examination of the well documented tensions which arise when the state auditor conducting performance audits, as opposed to statutory financial statement audits, seeks to navigate between the identities of independent auditor and an agent of modernisation (Skaerbaek 2009). In the latter role the state auditor “seeks to gain ground for change and to influence the designs of the consequent accounting system” whereas the state auditor in the more traditional and far less contentious role is more concerned with removing imperfections in the systems of accountability, or ‘purifying’ (Skaerbaek 2009, p. 972).

The paper firstly introduces the main participants in the study and discusses the interview process. Attention is then given to the central theme of the credibility of ANAO performance audit, which is presented and discussed within Birnbaum and Stegner’s three-dimensional source credibility framework of independence, technical competence and usefulness. The paper concludes with a summary of its findings and suggestions for further research. 

2. Participants and Research Method 
The ANAO sees itself as operating as “a specialist public sector agency providing a full range of audit services to the Parliament, Australian Government public sector entities and statutory bodies, as well as government corporations” (ANAO, 2004, p. 2)​[2]​. Performance audits of departments can be conducted at any time by the Auditor-General, with a report of the audit to be given to both houses of Parliament and to the minister responsible for the auditee. A typical performance audit report provides a detailed discussion of the objectives and scope of the audit, the nature of the operations of the agency audited, the circumstances which prompted the performance audit and key findings. Before the report is finalised the agency or department concerned are given the opportunity to comment on the report which will be provided to the JCPAA, with the responses of the agency and department. 

Recognising the dual nature of performance audits, the ANAO seeks to highlight achievement and identify, where necessary, opportunities for improvement. The intended outcomes of the ANAO’s operations are improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration and providing independent verification of Commonwealth public sector reporting, administration, control and accountability (www.anao.gov.au/director/aboutus.cfm>, viewed 5 September 2013). At all times the auditor works independently of auditees but does recognise that the improved performance which is the aim of a performance audit will ultimately depend upon the auditor understanding the circumstances of the auditee and making suggestions which are perceived as fair, balanced, practicable or useful and appropriate to the auditee. Thus, in one recent performance audit report of the Administration of the Assistance for Isolated Children Scheme, administered by the Department of Human Services (ANAO 2014-2015), the auditors concluded that “Overall, Human Services’ administration of the Scheme has been generally effective. … While the Scheme has consistently met the single performance target specified … there remains scope for some refinement of administrative and review arrangements …” (ANAO 2014-2015, p.14). During the observations for the present study, the audit team frequently and openly praised auditee staff for their efforts in a particular area and promised to consider it for inclusion in a Better Practice Guide, a promise that subsequently was honoured.  

In a manner similar to Keen (1999), Radcliffe (1999) and Sharma (2007) this study involves immersion in the empirical domain over an extended period of time. Rare permission, in the Australian context, was given to participate in the audit as an observer at various stages, including audit planning, evidence-gathering, discussions of findings between the auditee and the performance auditors and attending the review of the report by the parliamentary JCPAA. Attendance as an observer was made at regular intervals rather than as a constant presence. There was also limited access to some documents which pertained to the audit, documents which would normally be classified as in the public domain. Observing the audit through its various stages provided the means to document the interactions between audit and Agency staff, as well as the strategies and mechanisms they employed in dealing with one another, and to obtain evidence for triangulation with the study’s interview and archival data​[3]​. 

Whereas Skaerbaek’s (2009, p. 975) study used interviews to supplement direct observations of the auditing process, the aims of the present study required that primacy be given to the insights gained from the interviews while observations from the audit of the Agency supplemented the interview material. Unlike the study by Roberts and Pollitt (1994) which examined the conduct and results of a performance audit by the British National Audit Office after the audit had been completed, the present study has been able to draw upon information obtained from both interviews and observation throughout the conduct of a performance audit. To capture and preserve the richness of the empirics which this access has allowed, the voice of the participants is given prominence with direct quotations. 

Throughout the interviews the topics covered during conversations with participants evolved as insights on matters of original interest were obtained and new perspectives on performance audit emerged. The interviews for and observations of the present study were conducted over a period of 27 months with a total of 31 participants drawn from the ANAO, the Agency, private consulting firms that provide services under contract to the ANAO and members of the parliamentary JCPAA. The JCPAA is meant to fulfil a bi-partisan monitoring role on behalf of Parliament of the receipts and expenditures of the Commonwealth and the operations, resources and independence of the Auditor-General and his Office. Half of the auditor-participants were ANAO executives at Branch Head level or higher while the other half, employed at Director or Senior Director level, were members of teams directly engaged in audit fieldwork and analysis. These will be referred to, respectively, as ANAO executives and field auditors. As shown by Figure 3, two thirds of the Agency-participants were involved in managing programs that were currently the subject of an ANAO performance audit, while the rest were members of the Agency’s internal audit division. These will be referred to, respectively, as line managers and internal auditors. 

Insert Figure 3 Here

The interviewees can be grouped into three clusters.  The first cluster consists of audit and Agency staff directly implicated in the audit under observation. The issues raised with this cluster covered a wide range of topics, including: their experiences with, and expectations of, performance audit; the role they saw performance audit performing now and in the future; the kinds of challenges encountered as auditor or auditee and the changes to policies, processes, structures, relationships, staffing and training that might enhance its value. In addition, the opportunity was taken to explore specific issues that arose during the participant observation phase of the study, which commenced prior to the first of these interviews. The empirical material gathered from this cluster created a juxtaposition between Audit staff and Agency staff, and between interview and observational data, from which valuable insights into auditor/auditee relationships could be obtained.  Audit liaison officers were used to answer questions and provide the audit team with information. However, their role was not a disinterested one. Sometimes they reacted with hostility towards their respective audit teams, particularly in the early stages of the audit.

The second cluster of participants comprises ANAO consultants and the Agency’s internal auditors. The members of this cluster were similar to each other in that each was familiar with the performance audit process and experienced in dealing with auditees, albeit in different settings. They differed from one another, however, in the focus and strength of their allegiances. Whereas the internal auditors were strongly partisan towards the Agency, the consultants tended to empathise with the ANAO, although typically from a constructively critical position. The topics covered with this cluster were similar to those discussed during the first cluster of interviews except that, given the breadth of their experience with performance audit, special emphasis was placed on the strengths and weaknesses of the ANAO’s approach. The third, and final, cluster of participants consists of members of the ANAO’s executive staff and the JCPAA. This cluster differed from the other two in its members’ focus on contemporary audit policy and practice. With these participants, therefore, a more strategic approach was taken to the topics covered, commensurate with the respective interests and positions of the participants. 

Interview guides were never used during interviews, nor were fixed wording or ordering of questions. Rather, an open conversation was orchestrated around the topics of interest, based on the position, background and interests of the respective participants. The relatively unstructured format of these interviews enabled the participants to discuss their experiences and perceptions of performance audit in their own way. It also gave the researcher latitude to emphasise or de-emphasise particular topics and to explore additional lines of enquiry as they emerged from prior interviews and observations. In terms of their duration and recording, most interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes and were recorded at the participant’s workplace. The unedited transcripts were then sent to the participants by email for review and, if necessary, amendment and clarification. 

Whenever practicable the researcher accompanied the audit team on its fieldwork activities. The audit team conducted group and individual interviews with Agency staff, spoke with external stakeholders, observed Agency processes, attended demonstrations of computer-based tools and inspected facilities and documents. The researcher also attended two significant, albeit informal, meetings at which these findings were discussed; firstly between the audit team and ANAO executives and, secondly, between the team and the Agency official with overall responsibility for the audited program.  This resulted in certain amendments to the issues papers prior to their presentation at the formal exit interview. The exit interview is a meeting held with the auditee at the conclusion of the fieldwork stage of the audit but before the preparation and tabling of the audit report for Parliament. Such interviews provide an opportunity for the audit team to present provisional findings and for the auditee to correct misunderstandings and misinterpretations of a more factual nature. Overall, the participant observation stage of the study involved audit-related activities and events, encompassing approximately forty individually-recorded sessions. At all times the researcher endeavoured to maintain a physical and emotional distance between researcher and researched to sustain the trust of both Audit and Agency staff, who were distrustful of each other. 





3. The Criteria of Credibility
3.1 Auditor Independence 
Auditor independence refers to the principle, long-entrenched in audit discourse, that auditors must be, and be seen to be, willing and able to make objective, professional judgements, and to report them, free from the influence of those with a vested interest in the outcome. The auditor, who is the source of the judgements about the auditee, must be seen to be operating ‘independent’ of the auditee (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979, p.70).  Independence is the essential constitutional requirement if public sector auditors are to champion the public interest by providing a powerful means by which the Executive can be held to be accountable to the legislature and to the public (Mosher 1978, p. 235; Levin 1976, p. 41; Nichols and Price 1976, p. 335). For Heinig (in Normanton 1966, p. 402), and Pois (1981, p. 70), in his study of the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), a crucial element in the very preservation of democracy is a public sector auditor who is independent of the Executive and other interests (see also St. Pierre 1984, p. 257,. Knighton 1979, p. 6). A newspaper editorial in the Australian state of Victoria suggested that society’s faith in the importance of the impartial state auditor remains as strong as ever.
It is a simple but often neglected point that the public service exists to serve the community and that the primary responsibility of government is to serve its citizens. The money it receives and spends is not its own. It is the public's. And the great mass of people, not being in a position to adjudge this themselves, need an office that will do it impartially, with dedication, fervour and the governing attribute of holding to account how that money is used. No government, no matter how long it has been in power, should think itself purely by its longevity to be above accountability. Nor should public servants think similarly (The Age, 21 September 2006, p.  16).

In Westminster-style systems of public accountability, such as Australia’s, auditor independence has never been achievable in any absolute sense. Like his private sector counterparts, the Commonwealth Auditor-General is independent to the extent that he or she possesses statutory powers and protections related to their appointment and removal from office, their discretion to audit and report, and their access to information, rights that ostensibly were strengthened with the passing of the Auditor-General Act 1997. Yet, the Auditor-General and his office remain vulnerable to executive interference and retribution, regardless of their public portrayal to the contrary.  

The primary goal of performance improvement can be particularly problematic for perceptions of the independence of performance auditors. In one notable study, Gendron et al (2000) sought to determine whether public sector auditors who take a proactive role in promoting “best practice” as a constituent element of NPM might put themselves effectively into a consultancy relationship with auditees, thereby impairing auditor independence. Everett (2003, p. 78) similarly regards performance audit as a monitoring technology of NPM, with assessment criteria based on notions of economy and efficiency, which has made state auditors appear complicit with rationalist government ideology, thereby undermining their perceived neutrality, or independence, and hence weakening their credibility (see also Gendron et al 2000, p.  280). 

Skaerbaek’s (2009) study of the National Audit Office of Denmark provided a compelling example of the difficulties confronting state auditors in maintaining the confidence of stakeholders in their independence when they move from their identity as independent auditors to conducting performance audits as a critical contribution to the transformation of public sector accountability required by the NPM (Skaerbaek 2009, p. 972). Hence the potential for accusations of prejudice towards auditees and impaired independence if the reports seem to be aligned to the emerging political priorities of the Executive. For the Australian Auditor-General this ability to manoeuvre between the two roles as moderniser and independent auditor is greatly enhanced by the capacity of Auditors-General to influence the selection and reporting of audits. Importantly, whereas annual financial statement audits are obligatory for the Australian Auditor-General, under enabling legislation such as the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, performance audits are at the discretion of the Auditor-General. The choice of subject for a performance audit is most often prompted by a concern which is expressed by Parliament or a government initiative which assumes a controversial prominence. Section 8(4) of the Auditor-General Act 1997 also emphasises that the Auditor-General has
complete discretion in the performance or exercise of his or her functions or powers. In particular, the Auditor-General is not subject to direction from anyone in relation to: 
(a) whether or not a particular audit is to be conducted; or
(b) the way in which a particular audit is to be conducted; or
(c) the priority to be given to any particular matter.

During conversations with participants in the present study, on many occasions reference was made to auditor independence, or to a synonym (for example, impartiality or objectivity) or an antonym (for example, bias). Significantly, these references rarely arose as a result of a direct question about independence but rather were offered spontaneously during conversations on other matters. One ANAO executive interviewed, for example, readily confirmed the “importance of the Parliament having independent, objective advice provided to it” (Interview with ANAO #13). Indeed, all participants in this study believed that it is the attribute of independence which made state audit valuable to the Parliament and, thus, was the basis of its credibility. A “truly independent auditor”, confirmed one consultant, “is in everybody’s best interests” (Interview with ANAO Consultant #2). Hence, independence seems to be a taken for granted expectation for public sector audit while any perceptions that it is impaired would undermine the credibility of audit.

The obstacles to operating with independence which were most frequently mentioned by participants were problems in gaining access to evidence and the vigorous auditee challenges to audit findings often encountered by auditors. The ANAO is very aware of the importance for the office’s independence of the auditors not being intimidated by possible, and maybe understandable, auditee reactions. However, while ever an agency is in the public eye and performance audit by its nature tended to be critical,
unless you’re going to say (the Agency) is wonderful, you’re going to disappoint (the Agency). And that is not going to fit with the public image that they want to project. …. What we’re answerable for is, have we objectively reviewed what they’ve done, transparently reported it, and recommended how it should change to our customer, the Parliament. (Interview with ANAO #10).

According to an ANAO executive, auditees can employ a range of tactics in an attempt to limit access to evidence and, thus, prejudice the independence of the auditor. The tactics included “everything from having key staff not being available, to throwing up legal challenges with respect to privacy (and) the commercial nature of transactions. …We probably use more legal advice now than we ever did” (Interview with ANAO #8). Obstructive behaviour, which was also meant to intimidate auditors, could even involve requiring the auditors to deal directly with a senior Agency officer rather than, as is usual, with internal auditors (Interview with ANAO #7). One field auditor during the audit of the Agency observed that it is not unknown for aggressive behaviour by auditees to make performance auditors belligerent towards auditees rather than subservient (Interview with ANAO #7).

In contrast to auditor perceptions of the main impediments to independence, the auditee-participants tended in the first place to identify the notion of independence with the auditors’ willingness to report both positive and negative findings. That is, they equated independence with fairness and ‘balance’. One member of the Agency, while very supportive that his agency should “be accountable and transparent … so that all the people outside in the world who are paying for us to be here should know that their money’s being spent properly, ...”, believed that the auditors should be expected to “have some form of responsibility for painting a full picture” (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #4). Exposing problems, should they exist, was thought by one member of the Agency to be a reasonable expectation of the work of the auditor (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #3). Indeed, not to do so they believed would be to betray the trust placed in the auditors to protect the public interest and it would deny the fundamental expectation of public sector auditing, each of which had major implications for the credibility of any audit and the performance auditing function. At the same time, the interviewee expected the ANAO to “be impartial and part of impartiality to me would be, yes, we will dig the dirt on the thing that you are looking at but here’s also the positive side of it as well” (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #4). For one JCPAA member interviewed, however, being independent was not about balance or impartiality or complete reporting but, rather, about being apolitical. Indeed, the achievement of fairness demonstrated to the auditees that the auditors were not the captive of the JCPAA or the Parliament. He expected the auditor “to be absolutely proper when I’m in opposition and I’d expect them to be absolutely proper when we’re in government” (Interview with JCPAA Member #2). However, he believed that “some auditors-general, or some State auditors, have played a poor role in politicising their jobs and I think that that undermines the willingness of government departments to take advice from them” (Interview with JCPAA Member #2).

Some auditees saw independence as a possible obstacle to performance audits adding value by prejudicing effective auditor/auditee relations when auditors have been perceived to insist on “exaggerating” the separation of auditor and auditee. An Agency line manager referred to the advantages which would be possible if an audit team stayed for an extended period with an agency 
so that they could have a core body of knowledge. Whereas now they sort of walk into every audit with a different person who doesn’t know nothing.  …  So I think, even with that independence barrier … they could go a lot further than they are in terms of working with us (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #8).

In summary, although all categories of participants were keenly committed to the notion of auditor independence and appreciated its significance for the credibility of state audit, there appear to be differences among stakeholders as to the attributes that they ascribe to auditor independence. Consequentially, there will also be differences in expectations about how state auditors might be expected to behave as independent agents which, in turn, influences the extent to which participants believe performance audit to be credible or can be credible. Particularly relevant for engendering the credibility of performance auditing was recognition by both auditors and auditees of the importance of balance and fairness. Yet, by itself this was insufficient to establish the credibility of performance audit if the auditors were unable to convince auditees that they were not only knowledgeable in their craft but also well informed about the operations of the auditee, both of which are matters of technical competence and often vigorously disputed by auditees. 

3.2 Technical Competence 
For ANAO staff, technical competence, or expertise (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979, p.48), is about acting with due care and diligence in accordance with the ANAO’s Guide to Conduct (2004, p. 6) and compliance with the Auditor-General’s technical standards, as gazetted under Section 24 of the Auditor-General Act 1997. These cover, among other things, quality assurance and documentation, the application of audit concepts such as risk and materiality, acceptable methods of audit planning and evidence-gathering and the proper communication of audit findings. This will mean, conclude Birnbaum and Stegner (1979, p.48), that the expertise of the source of audit findings is confirmed by “the perceived correlation between the source’s report and the outcomes of empirical verification”. That is, what the auditors say is an accurate reflection of the auditee’s situation.

With performance audit practice permitting a high degree of subjective judgement, ethical pronouncements and auditing standards alone cannot ensure that performance auditors are seen to be competent. For performance audit every aspect of every audit is unique, from choosing the subject matter to refining the audit objectives and scope, to setting the assessment criteria and audit methodology, to gathering evidence and determining the audit outcomes. This means that performance audit places even higher demands on auditor judgement than its financial audit counterpart and is more susceptible to threats to its perceived credibility (Radcliffe 1999; Barrett 2011a, 2011b). According to Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p. 111), the exercise of audit judgement “is never free from unfortunate consequences”. This has significant implications for the type of skills that performance auditors will need to conduct a credible audit and produce an audit report which is seen by auditees and the Parliament as reliable. Most especially, according to one of the study’s consultant-participants, who was a former ANAO employee, an ongoing problem was “that the people who had been recruited to do financial audits and compliance audits didn’t have the analytical skills to do the wider, more conceptual kind of work that you needed” with performance audits (Interview with ANAO Consultant #4). This aspect was one of two key themes associated with technical competence which were repeatedly identified by both auditee and auditor participants: the skills and knowledge which are perceived to be required for conducting a performance audit and the importance of providing a quality performance audit product. Birnbaum and Stegner (1979, p.70) note that the “weight” of any evidence, and hence the credibility of the source, “depends mostly on the source’s expertise”.

For performance auditors there is no equivalent set of consistent, universally-applicable criteria against which performance can be assessed and no clearly-defined body of knowledge that distinguishes performance audit from other professions. This was a major concern for one ANAO executive who lamented that “there is no such thing yet as performance auditing … as a profession” (Interview with ANAO #8). Still, the requisite skills to be a successful performance auditor were well recognised by many of those interviewed. Notably, in addition to the desired expertise encompassing the fundamental requirements of experience and technical competence, or ability, as identified by Birnbaum and Stegner (1979, p.48), for one auditor the ‘perfect’ performance audit team needed “at least one real details person …; you have another more strategic person, good movers, they know what they’re looking for, and can go and get it, they have good relationships with the audit team, they do ask decent questions in a very soft, positive way, and they can efficiently analyse and write up reports” (Interview with ANAO #3). 

Many times in the interviews both auditees and auditors gave prominence to “people” skills as necessary attributes of the technical competence necessary for a successful performance audit, an attribute not normally recognised for financial statement auditors. Among the participants there were different ways of conceptualising these necessary people skills, depending on the affiliation of the participant. For the auditors, people skills were equated with the ability to interpret human behaviour, to “read the nuances of complex interactions and help you decipher what’s driving people or what they’re trying to do” (Interview with ANAO #4). This was confirmed independently by another field auditor who believed that performance auditing needed people with a “background in the humanities ... people that have a passion for finding things out, people who can write well, people who’ve got good interpersonal skills, all these sort of holistic sorts of things” (Interview with ANAO #4). The importance of this for auditees was demonstrated when one member of the Agency was prepared to praise extravagantly an ANAO auditor who “had superb people skills. You could sit down and have a good chat with him. You could explain your side of the story (and) he would listen” (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #9). 

ANAO #1 stressed the importance of personal attributes such as persistence and self-confidence when dealing with auditees for often “people will be telling you you’re wrong and giving you negative feedback and you have to cope with situations where you deal with difficult people”, situations which unfortunately are not infrequent in the experience of ANAO #1. For ANAO #1 it was not unusual after a six hour exit interview with any unhappy auditee for ANAO #1 to be called ‘stupid’ and to be accused of “not knowing what you’re talking about”. Despite these personal attacks, the auditor was not to allow this to affect their ability to conduct an audit in a spirit of objective independence. Most especially, these concerns were never to be used as excuses to modify audit reports to allow performance auditors to meet auditee expectations. The comments of one auditor confirmed that auditees might seek to undermine the authority of an audit by questioning the specific subject expertise of the auditors. 
I’ve used a lot of consultants in my work because they’re not things that I know a lot about and you have to be very careful to have somebody who can back up what you’ve said with their expert knowledge because if you’ve said something negative to an auditee they’ll argue to the death with you to get it changed, generally speaking (Interview with ANAO #1).

For auditee-participants the complex and rapidly changing nature of their organisation was something that they felt ANAO performance auditors had difficulty in comprehending. The auditors were accused of being ignorant or uninformed of the relevant specifics of the auditee’s operations. Therefore, the auditors were prone to “draw some conclusions a bit too quickly without really getting into the substance of it” (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #9), thereby adversely reflecting on their competence. Auditors also referred to the challenges to their work from a public service embedded in increasingly complex legal frameworks which were needed to manage new purchaser/provider arrangements related to outsourcing (Interview with ANAO #1). For one ANAO executive the notion of complexity was bound up with the increasing sophistication of performance audit itself. “For auditors to get across the complexity of program delivery methods, is a real challenge” (Interview with ANAO #8). An inability to deal successfully with the increasing complexity of the operations of auditees was seen by many participants to affect ultimately the usefulness of audits and, hence, their credibility.

3.3 Audit usefulness 
The dual nature of performance auditing as both a means of improvement and as a form of parliamentary control becomes especially contentious when considering the usefulness of the audits. The evidence collected for this study clearly confirms that the auditor is expected to fulfil expectations which provide a message that is both valuable to users, most especially the auditee, and which is perceived by parliamentary regulators as reliable for the purpose of monitoring the performance of auditees. The usefulness of performance auditing in the time of the NPM relates primarily to the ability of audit reports to enhance the operating efficiency of auditees. Barrett (2011a, p.99) notes that the absence of program outcome indicators in performance audit reports makes assessment of the usefulness of performance audits “very difficult”.

The study’s auditee-participants often expressed doubts about the usefulness of performance audits. When asked whether he thought ANAO auditors bring a value-adding or fault finding mentality to their audits, whereby they were only seeking to find weaknesses and not to be useful to the auditee by assisting with improvement, a line manager in the Agency was prepared to admit that there were times when both approaches were appropriate. Auditors should determine whether 
government organisations are acting as they should. But I also think there’s another role in looking at improving the efficiency of government. The sort of audit that I enjoy is where they’ve looked at the processes that are happening in the organisation and think, well, hang on, that’s reasonable. It’s probably not as effective as it should be, and maybe if they did these sorts of things that it may improve the efficiency of the organisation, and I see that as critical to an audit (Auditee Line Manager #1).

Echoing the importance given by auditees to fairness and balance as a qualification for a credible audit, an appreciation of the potentially positive role of performance audits for auditees was confirmed by another Agency line manager who liked the way in which auditors might both compliment an agency for taking the initiative to implement improvements and indicate when “we’re not going in the right direction” (Auditee Line Manager #6). Then, there were those auditee-participants who had only negative views about ANAO performance audit and its usefulness, driven by what they perceived as the motivations of the ANAO’s ultimate stakeholder, the Parliament. Thus, they saw little possibility that performance audits could be useful to auditees. The performance auditors are “there for Parliament, not for anybody else. It depends on what Parliament wants. If parliamentarians want to find dirt or mud so that they can sling it, so that’s what the auditors do” (Interview with Auditee Line Manager #4). 

The legitimacy of accusations of the sensationalising tendencies of performance auditing was surprisingly confirmed by one ANAO executive when he agreed that the Parliament and the press were only likely to be interested when audits “criticise an agency’s accuracy level of customer service or the quality of customer service … Suddenly you have headlines and suddenly you have a great deal of interest in the Parliament” (Interview with ANAO #8). Ultimately what was important to the Parliament, observed ANAO #5, was that “we find something … (to criticise)”. Indeed, JCPAA Member #1 seemed to justify the worst suspicions of auditees about the expectations that Parliament had for performance audits when he lamented what he saw as increasingly “bland” performance audits which meant that “one needs to look carefully to find juicy bits to go to work on”. These comments bring to mind concerns expressed by Schuele Walton and Brown (1990, pp. 3-4) about the compatibility of roles between the auditor and the legislator: the one concerned with “professional objectivity and independence”, the other with “serving their constituents and getting re-elected”. Schuele Walton and Brown argued, among other things, that the legislature’s role in oversight is of little interest to individual legislators unless it brings credit from the public through press coverage, which in turn is likely to occur only if there are ‘juicy bits’. 

An ANAO executive saw the value of ANAO performance auditing to Parliament as bound up with its ability to help the Parliament “get behind the bureaucratic wall” (Interview with ANAO #10). This was later confirmed by another ANAO executive who stressed the importance of performance audits in a much more complex public sector environment as a source of information for the Parliament. “With devolution and so forth … the only way that the Parliament now gets a view across the Australian Public Service (APS) in a number of areas is through the Office (the ANAO)” (Interview with ANAO #4). Thus, rather than claims that adding value to public administration is the ANAO’s overarching aim, much of the study’s empirical data suggests that the ANAO’s responsibility to the Parliament, that is its role as an independent auditor, is still seen as paramount rather than being of use to the agency audited, a finding that is consistent with Radcliffe (1999) and Morin (2003). At the end of the day, an ANAO executive confirmed, the ANAO was never to lose sight of the interests of the Parliament (Interview with ANAO #14). 

The Auditor-General’s responsibility to the Parliament and their desire to add value to public administration may mean that they will be pulled in different directions. While Parliament wants the auditor to provide “a certain amount of deterrence” (Interview with ANAO #14), the performance auditors also see as critical to the credibility of their work getting across “the message that we are adding value. Not that we’re soft and nice and cuddly, but that we’re adding value” (Interview with ANAO Consultant #1). However, this did not represent conflicting expectations of efficiency audits for one ANAO executive who argued that “the customer being Parliament and adding value are not necessarily at odds because Parliament expects our audits to add some value too, so they expect that, over time, a large number of the audits will identify areas that can be improved” (Interview with ANAO Executive #3). If the main aim was to add value to public administration this required reporting to Parliament findings about how efficient and effective agencies were in performing and being managed, which has much potential for criticism of the auditee (Interview with ANAO #8). It also required timely reporting of the performance audit. 

According to some participants the increasing involvement of senior agency officials and ministers in the clearance process, that is prior to finalising the audit report, was having an especially noticeable effect on the timeliness and, hence, the usefulness of audit reports. One senior ANAO executive observed that
more and more senior people are getting involved, especially in draft reports.  So while you may have a good, common understanding through the process, when the draft report actually hits the agency and goes to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary level, there’s a renewed level of interest, albeit new because they have not been party to previous dealings.  Now that causes a problem, of course, because, if people are defensive, they may not remember, for one reason or another, the conversations we’ve had in the past (Interview with ANAO #8).  

The involvement of ministers and secretaries in the audit process was a feature which was particularly noted by field auditors as the cause of increasing delays in reporting audits.
There’s a lot more ministerial interference, I guess you’d call it, and we were told last week that the issues papers for one audit had gone to the Minister, directly.  And the Minister was making comments on them.  So, and that’s at the issues paper stage (Interview with ANAO #7)!

4. Summary and conclusion
This study has adapted Birnbaum and Stegner’s theory of source credibility to assess the credibility of ANAO performance audit against the criteria of auditor independence, technical competence and audit usefulness, based on the perceptions and actions of the study’s stakeholder-participants at the level of performance audit practice. Analysis of their responses reveals a general respect for the principle of auditor independence, a common belief that to be a competent performance auditor requires high level analytical and communication skills, and a view that ANAO performance audit is useful, or at least potentially useful, for public accountability and performance improvement. Yet, the study also suggests that the conformance of ANAO performance audit with the norms and values of a credible audit function can be problematic, with all three of its credibility criteria exhibiting signs of impairment. This, according to Birnbaum and Stegner, would mean that when assessed against the criteria of auditor independence, technical competence and audit usefulness, the credibility of ANAO performance audit is compromised in a number of important respects at the micro level of practice. 
	
Imperfections of, and impairments to, auditor independence, technical competence and audit usefulness that emerged as part of the findings of this study suggest the existence of a gap between formal institutional understandings of ANAO performance audit credibility and its everyday experience in the field. For example, at the macro level, the enactment of the Auditor-General Act 1997 is typically believed to have enhanced the independence of the Auditor-General and the ANAO, yet there are a range of factors at the micro level that this study has shown threaten auditor and audit credibility. The study also revealed how differing conceptions of the construct of independence held by the study’s stakeholder-participants may affect the perceived credibility of performance audits. Whereas the auditor-participants spoke of auditor independence in traditional terms of freedom of access and reporting, the auditee-participants tended to equate it with notions of fairness and objectivity. Independence for auditees was about the willingness of ANAO auditors to record and report both positive and negative findings and to approach audits without preconceived ideas. 

The study has also revealed resilient differences in the understandings about the technical competence of auditors which has implications for the perceived credibility of performance auditing. The most important skills related to technical competence to emerge from the data were generic skills, especially analytical, people and communication skills, a finding that supports research reported elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Radcliffe, 1999). Yet, the empirical evidence also reveals differences among the study’s participants in their understandings of these skills. For the auditors and consultants, for example, “people skills” referred to their ability to coerce auditee staff to cooperate, while for auditees it meant sophisticated social skills. Some auditor-participants also spoke of the importance of investigation skills and an interest in public administration as well as personal attributes such as persistence and self-confidence. None of the participants, however, referred to a specific body of core knowledge or skills that might be used to associate a performance auditor with a distinctive professional discipline. The other challenges to technical competence include the complexity of modern government structures, programs and administrative arrangements, problems of recruitment, training and knowledge transfer among performance audit staff.  Auditee-participants expressed more negative views about technical competence than the auditors and consultants, who recognised the challenges of audit but were confident of their capacity to handle them.  

For the audit credibility criterion of audit usefulness most auditor-participants referred in some way or another to the notion of adding value, some from a macro-level perspective and others from a more personal, micro-level perspective. Evidence obtained in the present study about the perceived usefulness of performance auditing and which is also reported elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Radcliffe, 1999; Morin, 2003; and Sharma, 2007; Skaerbaek, 2009) has identified the potential for role conflict between public accountability and performance improvement objectives. An Auditor-General seeking a higher public profile as a watchdog of public accountability might be tempted to focus on ‘gotchers’ and ‘juicy bits’ rather than public management improvement, thus improving his or her standing with the Parliament at the expense of the auditor-auditee relationship and the ability of the performance audit to be seen to add value to the operations of auditees.  

Access to audit reports soon after the conclusion of an audit was regarded by participants as critical to the usefulness of any recommendations. Indeed, the timeliness issue was seen as problematic for auditees, auditors and consultants alike, although there were marked differences in views among the participants as to the causes of delay. Whereas, as noted above, some participants related delays in reporting audits to the meddling involvement of senior executive officials, one auditee-participant, for example, attributed the problem to the incompetence and laziness of the auditors while for one consultant it resulted from the ANAO’s overly-bureaucratic quality assurance processes. Meanwhile, auditor-participants blamed the stalling tactics of auditees, especially when sensitive audits attract the interest of ministers and senior officials.
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^1	  Members of the auditee interviewed by Skaerbaek (2009, p. 979) in his study of the Danish National Audit Office also objected to the manner in which performance auditors may “interfere and indirectly become involved in politics. In this way, they may actually violate the Danish constitution, according to which the Office shall be an independent body”.
^2	  For further details of the history and mandate of the ANAO see Funnell, Cooper and Lee (2012).
^3	  The archival material included previous audit reports related to the Agency and documents covering various aspects of the operations and history of the agency.
